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TIE UNDIVIDED FEE RULE IN CALIFORNIA
When land is condemned under the power of eminent domain the
owner or owners of such land are entitled to just compensation.'
Measured in terms of money, just compensation is usually taken to
be the market value of such land.2 Market value is a question of fact 3
determined by evaluating the testimony of various experts regarding
the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller if both parties
were aware of all the relevant facts about the land.4 One of the
major problems facing the court in a condemnation proceeding is to
ascertain which facts are relevant to the- determination of market
value and which are not.
One of the more troublesome of the potentially critical facts is
the rental value of the condemned property when it is encumbered
with a leasehold estate. There is a substantial conflict in the Cali-
fornia cases as well as in the cases of other states as to how this fact
should be treated.
The basic question is whether the market value of the condemned
land should be determined by aggregating the interests of the separ-
ate owners,5 or by viewing the land as an unencumbered, undivided
fee.8 In theory at least, the total sum paid by the condemnor, and
apportioned among the holders of the various interests, 7 should be
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Similar provisions are found in most of the
state constitutions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
2 See National City Bank v. United States, 275 F. 855, 859 (S.D.N.Y.
1921); 4 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAw or EMINENT DoMAix §§ 12.2, 12.2(1) (rev. 3d
ed. 1962).
8 Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 13, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (1967).
4 Sacramento S.R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980 (1909);
Redevelopment Agency v. Zwerman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 70, 74-75, 49 Cal. Rptr.
443, 446 (1966); Daly City v. Smith, 110 Cal. App. 2d 524, 531, 243 P.2d 46, 50
(1952).
5 This method is referred to as the aggregate of interests rule. For a
statement of this rule by a California court, see Sacramento Drainage Dist. v.
Truslow, 125 Cal. App. 2d 478, 489, 270 P.2d 928, 935 (1954). See also Federal
Oil Co. v. Culver City, 179 Cal. App. 2d 93, 98-100, 3 Cal. Rptr. 519, 522-23
(1960).
6 This method is referred to as the undivided fee rule. For a statement
and application of this rule by a California court, see People ex rel. Department
of Pub. Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53
(1956).
7 This is true, at least, in California. See Costa Mesa Union School Dist.
v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal. App. 4, 13, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (1967);
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(1).
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the same in either case.s In practice, however, the two rules for
determining market value have taken on substantive variations, re-
sulting in different amounts being awarded to the condemnees in
certain situations.9 The difference between the two rules for deter-
mining market valuation is that they stem from two apparently ir-
reconcilable theories.
10
The. theory behind the undivided fee rule, which has long been
the majority rule," is that a condemnation proceeding is an action in
rem against a parcel of land.12  On the other hand, the aggregate of
interests rule is founded upon the constitutionally guaranteed right of
a landowner to be compensated when his property is taken for a
public use.' 3
The prevalence of the undivided fee rule can be explained in
terms of the courts' desire for simplicity and practicality,'14 in that:
First, the value of the unencumbered land usually equals, or approxi-
mates, the aggregate of the separate interests; 15 secondly, much ef-
8 For a discussion of some of the difficulties that arise in making this
assumption, see Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L.
REV. 477, 490-93 (1962).
9 See, e.g., Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 630-31, 61 A. 203, 206
(1905).
10 See Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain--Policy and Concept, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954).
"1 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 875, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1967); 2 J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 716 (3d ed. 1909); 4 P. NIcHoLS, THE LAW OF EMINNT
DomAIN, § 12.36 (rev. 3d ed. 1962); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF
EMINENT DomAIN § 109, at 461 (2d ed. 1953).
12 See, e.g., Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182,
184 (5th Cir. 1947); Reeves v. Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 581-82 (Tex. Ct. App.
1946).
'3 See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910);
Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. Rav.
596, 615-20 (1954). It is interesting to note that when the aggregate of interests
rule has been adopted on the basis of the owner's right to compensation, the
courts have said that the undivided fee rule is based upon the theory that the
measure of compensation should be the taker's gain. See, e.g., Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910). On the other hand, when the un-
divided fee rule has been adopted, the theoretical justification for its use was
the in rem nature of the condemnation proceeding, while the alternative aggre-
gate of interests rule was said to be based upon the theory that the taking was
of a cluster of rights that together amount to ownership. See, e.g., Eagle Lake
Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 1947). This
failure of the courts which adopt either the undivided fee rule or the aggregate
of interests rule to reject specifically the theory on which the alternative rule
is actually based provides a good illustration of the conceptual difficulties
encountered in this branch of the law of eminent domain.
14 See 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw OF EmInENT DoMAIN, § 109
(2d ed. 1953).
15 Id. § 112, at 480.
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fort is saved in separating the practical question of value from the
often legally complex question of apportionment; 16 and thirdly, it is
much easier for the condemnor to estimate in advance the necessary
monetary outlay for an unencumbered fee.
7
The purpose of this note is to explicate the use and nonuse of the
undivided fee rule in California. An understanding of the law in
California is impossible, however, without first recognizing the sub-
stantive implications that arise when the undivided fee rule is ap-
plied in two fact situations.
The Inconsistent Results of the Undivided Fee Rule
There are two situations in which the total compensation for the
condemnation of leasehold-encumbered land will vary depending
upon whether the undivided fee rule or the aggregate of interests
rule is applied.'
8
Disparity Between Rental Income and Market Level
The first situation is that in which a lessor receives from his
property either a greater or lesser rental income than the current
market level. When neither the lessor nor the lessee has an inflated
or deflated interest, the market value of the lessee's interest is zero
and there is no problem in awarding compensation. 8 If rental in-
come is less than the market level, the lessor's interest is deflated
while the lessee's is inflated. 20  If the rental income exceeds the
market level, however, the lessor's interest is inflated while the
lessee's is deflated.2' It is in this latter situation that valuation
problems arise.
Because the lessor's interest will usually retain some market value
despite a disadvantageous lease, there is no difficulty in awarding a
lessee the inflated amount of his lease by reducing the lessor's share
of the award.22 The problem arises when the lessor's interest is in-
flated and the lessee's deflated. Since the lessee's interest is value-
10 St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 1104, 64 S.W.2d 600, 605 (1933).
17 See 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 109
(2d ed. 1953).
18 The two situations about to be discussed are not exhaustive, but they
are particularly relevant to the use and nonuse of the undivided fee rule in
California. For other situations in which the use or nonuse of the undivided
fee rule has substantive implications, see 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE
LAw OF EiMINENT DovAnm §§ 107, 108 (2d ed. 1953).




22 See Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254
Cal. App. 2d 4, 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1967); People ex rel Department of
Pub. Works v. Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797, 808-09 (1963).
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less, it cannot absorb the loss occasioned by the excess value that is
due the lessor. When the undivided fee rule or the aggregate of all
the owner's interests rule is applied, the results are the same and no
difficulty is encountered. When, however, only those owner's in-
terests which have a market value are included in the computation
of the condemnation award, excluding the deflated interest of the
lessee, then the lessee is unjustly enriched at the expense of either
the lessor or the condemnor. Application of the undivided fee rule
would result in the unjust enrichment of the lessee at the expense
of the lessor, as the lessor loses the above market value of his lease.
Under the aggregate of the interests rule, the lessee is again unjustly
enriched but at the expense of the taxpayer as the condemnor pays
the inflated value of the lease to the lessor but receives only the
lower fair market value of the land.
Land Encumbered With a Restrictive Lease
The second fact situation in which the use or nonuse of the un-
divided fee rule has substantive implications is where the lessee is
restrained by the terms of the lease from using the land in the best
and most profitable manner, and there is no corresponding pecuniary
advantage to the lessor.
In this type of situation it cannot be said that either party has an
over- or undervalued interest. The discrepancy in the total amount
of compensation awarded for the condemned land that results from
the use or nonuse of the undivided fee rule arises only from the dis-
use of the land and not from an inflated or deflated valuation of the
lessor's or lessee's interest. The result is that a choice must be made
between a policy favoring the owners, or one favoring the condemnor.
Application of the undivided fee rule frees the lessor and lessee from
the restrictive lease and pays them more than their interests would
be worth on the open market.2 3 On the other hand, use of the aggre-
gate of the interests rule results in payment of the market value of
the owners' respective interests, thereby unjustly enriching the con-
demnor, as the fair market value of the land would be more than the
total amount of compensation paid.
24
Where the lessee's interest is deflated, as in the first fact situation,
the issue is whether the lessor or the condemnor should bear the bur-
den of the lessee's deflated interest. Application of the undivided
fee rule favors the condemnee in this case. Where the land is not used
in its highest and most profitable manner, as in the second fact situa-
tion, the issue is whether the lessor or the condemnor should be en-
riched. Application of the undivided fee rule in this case favors the
23 The rule is employed in this manner in People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53
(1956).
24 This is the approach taken in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Bos-
ton, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
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lessor. It should be obvious that even if one felt justified in declaring
either the rights of the lessor or the rights of the public as
paramount,25 nevertheless, strict adherence to either one rule or the
other precludes a consistent result. Each rule favors the lessor in
one situation and the condemnor in the other. It remains to be seen
how California treats the conflict between these rules.
The Undivided Fee Rule in California
California statutes, as well as court decisions, appear to support
both the undivided fee and the aggregate of interests rules. Section
1246.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure gives the condemnor
the right to have the value of the land determined as a whole, after
which it is apportioned among the interest holders.26 On the other
hand, Code of Civil Procedure section 1248(1) requires that each in-
terest in the condemned land be valued separately and each owner
be given the value of his interest.2 7 California Evidence Code section
817 provides that existing leases or rents are a proper element to be
considered in fixing the market value of the land,28 whereas Evidence
Code section 812 indicates that section 817 is not to be construed as
25 Inferentially, at least, a judgment which favors the public is made
whenever the value of the undivided fee is taken to be the upper limit of com-
pensation. On the other hand, it is arguable that whenever the concept of
indemnity is employed (e.g., when severance damages are awarded) the court
has presupposed the segregation of two issues: First, the paramount right of
the public to take the property; and second, the paramount right of the con-
demnee to be compensated.
26 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1246.1: "Where there are two or more estates
or divided interests in property sought to be condemned, the plaintiff is en-
titled to have the amount of the award for said property first determined as
between plaintiff and all defendants claiming any interest therein; thereafter
in the same proceeding the respective rights of such defendants in and to the
award shall be determined by the court, jury, or referee and the award appor-
tioned accordingly. The costs of determining the apportionment of the award
shall be allowed to the defendants and taxed against the plaintiff except that
the costs of determining any issue as to title between two or more defendants
shall be borne by the defendants in such proportion as the court may direct."
27 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248: "The court, jury, or referee must hear
such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceed-
ings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess ... [tlhe value of the property
sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the
realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; if it consists
of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each estate or interest therein
shall be separately assessed. .. Y
28 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 817: "When relevant to the determination of
the value of property, a witness may take into account as a basis for his
opinion the rent reserved and other terms and circumstances of any lease
which included the property or property interest being valued or any part
thereof which was in effect within a reasonable time before or after the date
of valuation."
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affecting substantive law on the subject.2 9
In sum, California statutory law embraces neither the undivided
fee rule nor the aggregate of interests rule. It should not be inferred,
however, that the code provisions are inconsistent. Although Code of
Civil Procedure section 1248(1) calls for separate valuation of separate
interests, it does not exclude the possibility of dividing up a fund
calculated on the basis of an undivided fee. Moreover, even though
section 1246.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure calls for an evaluation of
the fee as a whole, this evaluation need not rest on the premise that
the fee is an unencumbered whole. As declared in People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. Lynbar, Inc.:30
The fact that in this situation, by resorting to section 1246.1, the con-
demnor can force the valuation award against it to be a single sum for
the entire fee ... does not compel the conclusion as a corollary to this
requirement that the total fee so valued must of necessity be valued as
if it were owned only by one owner, when in fact it is actually owned
jointly by more than one owner.81
The California Supreme Court has not directly decided whether
the undivided fee or the aggregate of the interests rule should be
applied where the lessee's interest has no market value, or where the
highest and best use of the land is restricted by the terms of the lease.
The few decisions that approach the problem seem to contain elements
of both positions, and have supplied dicta that can be used to support
either rule.32 Consequently, the appellate courts have been left free
to adopt or to denounce the undivided fee rule. They have done
both. For example, the Second District Appellate Court, in People ex
rel. Department of Public Works v. Lynbard, Inc., 33 denounced the un-
divided fee rule,34 while five days later, the appellate court for the
Fourth District adopted it.
35
The Search for a New Rule: The Lynbar Case
The California case law concerning the undivided fee rule can
best be analyzed by first looking at the Lynbar decision since, while
it is misleading, it does present the most comprehensive analysis of
the problem. The defendant, Lynbar, Inc., leased real property to
29 CAL. EVIDENC E CoDE § 812: "This article is not intended to alter or
change the existing substantive law, whether statutory or decisional, inter-
preting "just compensation" as used in Section 14 of Article I of the State
Constitution or the terms "value," "damage," or "benefits" as used in Section
1248 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
30 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967).
31 Id. at 879, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
32 See, e.g., People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Thompson, 43
Cal. 2d 13, 23, 271 P.2d 507, 513 (1954); Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198,
211, 25 P.2d 826, 832 (1933).
33 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967).
34 Id. at 882, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
35 Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (1967).
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Tide Water Realty Company 6 for 20 years at a minimum rental of
$725 per month. At the date of valuation, the lease had 17 years and
10 months to run. Prior to the execution of the lease, and until the
date of valuation, the property was the site of a retail service station.
The condemnee's sole valuation witness estimated the fair market
value of the property at $180,000, giving full consideration to the
Tidewater lease. The condemnor's two valuation witnesses, without
consideration of Tidewater's lease, estimated the fair market value of
the property at $55,000 and $52,000, respectively. The same two wit-
nesses, considering the leasehold value, estimated the property's mar-
ket value at $89,475 and $125,000, respectively. Thereafter, the parties
stipulated in open court that the fair market value of the property
was $125,000, subject to the condemnor's right to attack the method of
valuation on appeal.
The condemnors argued on appeal that Code of Civil Procedure
section 1246.1 required that the determination of the fair market value
of the property be grounded on the premise that the property was
held in single undivided ownership despite the existence of a lease
favorable to the lessor at the date of valuation. The condemnees, on
the other hand, argued that in view of the California Supreme Court
decision in People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Dunn 7 and
Evidence Code section 817, it was proper to consider existing rental
income on the condemned property. The appellate court accepted the
conclusion of the condemnees but rejected the reasoning of both par-
ties, concluding that Code of Civil Procedure section 1246.1 was purely
procedural,8s that Evidence Code section .817 was not only procedural
but had not yet become effective when the .case was tried,39 and that
the Dunn case was inconclusive.
40
Rather than adopt the arguments of either- party, the court posed
the question, "of what does the whole really consist, for which pay-
ment is to be made by the condenor in one lump sum under section
1246.1, if it so elects?" 41 The Lynbar court answered the question by
affirming the holding of the trial court and thereby compensated the
lessor for his inflated interest.
Of the propositions advanced in support of the court's holding,
three merit considerable attention.- First, the basis of compensation
should be what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained.
42
36 Between the trial and the appeal of the Lynbar case Tide Water Realty
Co. transferred all its assets, including its interest in the property involved in
this case, to the Tidewater Oil Co. See 253 Cal. App. 2d at 873 n.1, 62 Cal. Rptr.
at 323 n.1. The lease will hereinafter be referred to as the "Tidewater" lease.
37 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956).
38 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 878, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 326 (1967).-
39 Id. at 877, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 325. -
40 Id. at 876-77, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
41 Id. at 879, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
42 Id. at 882, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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Secondly, the fair market value of the land taken should be deter-
mined by consideration of, among other things, the condition in which
the land was taken, including the existing lease.43 Thirdly, while the
undivided fee rule is the majority rule, it is not the rule in Califor-
nia.
44
Compensation Based on What the Owner Has Lost
The first justification of the holding in Lynbar is that compensa-
tion should be based on what the owner has lost. This justification
fails to support the Lynbar holding for two reasons: First, the cases
relied upon in Lynbar to support the idea that the owner's loss should
be the measure of compensation contain such distinct fact situations
that they are not compelling authority in the fact situation presented
in Lynbar. Second, the per curiam opinion denying a rehearing of the
Lynbar case indicates that the court was confused about the theory
on which it meant to base compensation.
The absence of compelling authority is most evident in the Lyn-
bar court's reliance upon Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston.45
In Boston, Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion, quoted in the Lynbar case,46
held that the controlling question was "[W] hat has the owner lost,
not what has the taker gained. '47 The Boston case, however, involved
the condemnation of land encumbered with an easement of passage.
It is well settled that the market value of an easement is based on the
diminution in the value of land to which the easement is appurte-
nant 4s because the easement has no market value (i.e., cannot be sold)
apart from the dominant estate.49  Since the owner's loss is merely
different terminology for the diminution in value of the dominant
estate, it is fair to conclude that the peculiarity of easements appur-
tenant compelled the use of the owner's loss as the measure of com-
pensation in the Boston case. Because the Lynbar case does not in-
volve the condemnation of easements, the Boston case does not logi-
cally compel the use of the owner's loss as a measure of compensation
in Lynbar.
43 Id. at 881, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
44 Id. at 878, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
45 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
46 253 Cal. App. 2d at 882, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
47 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
48 Hemmerling v. Tomlev, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 572, 575, 432 P.2d 697, 699, 63
Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1967); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Logan, 198
Cal. App. 2d 581, 586, 17 Cal. Rptr. 674, 677 (1961).
49 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 107, at
455 (2d ed. 1953). The irrelevancy of the market value of the servient, con-
demned estate is well demonstrated by the inverse condemnation action in
Smith v. San Diego, 252 Cal. App. 2d 438, 442-43, 60 Cal. Rptr. 602, 605 (1967),
where the complainant failed even to describe in the complaint the property
interest taken-an easement. The complainant was given leave to amend, but
the point was well made that the claim was for damage to the remaining
parcel.
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None of the other cases used in the Lynbar opinion as authority
for using the owner's loss as the measure of compensation involved
the condemnation of divided interests.50 This is a critical variation
from the facts in Lynbar because to talk of what the owner (singular)
has lost when there are divided interests is either nonsense (there
being more than one owner by definition), or the assumption has al-
ready been made that the interest of one of the owners is to be ex-
cluded from the computation of compensation. It is apparent, there-
fore, that the use of the owner's loss as a measure of compensation
when there is only one owner not only fails to compel the use of that
measure in Lynbar, where there was more than one owner, but in-
volves concepts which are analytically unrelated.
Not only do the cases relied upon by Lynbar appear to be less
than compelling authority, but also, the per curiam opinion denying
a petition for rehearing the Lynbar case indicates either that the
court was confused about the owner's loss theory or that it knowingly
rejected the theory of compensation based on the owner's loss and
advanced a new rule that conflicts with well-settled California law.
In the per curiam opinion it is said:
If the actual rent under the existing lease is above the fair rental value
of the parcel taken, ordinarily the fair market value of that parcel
will be enhanced and the condenmor must pay more for it by way of
compensation. If, on the other hand, the actual rental under the exist-
ing lease is less than such fair rental value, ordinarily the fair market
value ... will be reduced accordingly and the condemnor pays
less .... 51
It can easily be inferred from this language that when the lessee is
paying less than the fair rental value he would not be entitled to the
"bonus value" or market value of his leasehold estate. To deprive
the lessee of the market value of his lease, however, is unquestionably
inconsistent with California law.52 Furthermore, it would make no
sense to require, as does California Code of Civil Procedure section
1248(1), 5 3 an apportionment of the total award among the various
owners if it is assumed from the outset that the lessee, one of the
owners, is not entitled to the market value of his lease. It is doubtful
that the court in Lynbar meant to advocate the result that the loss
incurred by the lessee-owner would not be compensated, and the
actual holding in Lynbar, as well as the court's justification for that
holding, is that an owner's loss should be compensated. It is, there-
fore, much more likely that the suggestion in the per curiam opinion
reflects the court's complete misunderstanding of the correct applica-
50 See Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); People v.
La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953).
51 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 884, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 330 (1967).
52 See, e.g., Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank,
254 Cal. App. 2d 4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1967); Budaef v. Huber, 194 Cal. App. 2d
12, 14 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1961).
53 See note 27 supra.
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tion of the theory of compensation based on the owner's loss.
The missing link in Lynbar court's reasoning was a justification
for excluding from the computation of compensation the interest of the
lessee, one of the two owners. Since this exclusion was a vital step
in fixing the amount of compensation in Lynbar, to presuppose this
exclusion by talking of the loss of one owner when there are two
owners is a critical error. It necessarily precludes the possibility of
justifying the Lynbar holding either on the basis of those authorities
that adopt the owner's loss as the measure of compensation, or on the
supposition that a new rule was being advocated. It is therefore
suggested that the Lynbar court's first justification for its holding
fails, in fact, to support that holding.
Compensation That Accounts For The Land's Divided Ownership
The second proposition advanced in Lynbar is, as stated by the
court, that: "[T]he property, together with all of its compensable
attributes, must be valued as the condemnor finds it, including with-
out limitation thereby, the state of its title, and in this case, the Tide-
water leasehold. ' 54 The court appears to be suggesting that the total
award to be apportioned should include the value of all contractual
rights that affect the ownership of the condemned land. In other
words, the holding in Lynbar, in effect, compensated directly for the
lessor's right to receive rental income without particular reference to
the market value of the land itself.
If this proposition were meant in its broadest sense, however, the
result in Lynbar would have been different. Full consideration of the
contractual relationships existing at the time of the condemnation
would have resulted in an arrangement whereby the condemnor would
have been subrogated to the rights of the lessor against the lessee.
An analogous result was achieved in In re Braddock Avenue.55
In the Braddock case, the New York court awarded the mortgagee
compensation based on the value of the unencumbered fee, while
holding that the fee owners were entitled only to nominal damages
based on a valuation of the encumbered fee. This unique method of
compensation arose because, after the mortgagee had acquired his in-
terest in the property, the mortgagor subjected the property to cer-
tain easements without the consent of the mortgagee. Since the
mortgagee's rights were not limited by the easements, he was entitled
to an award equaling the value of the property without consideration
of the easements. To avoid unjustly enriching the mortgagor by re-
ducing the mortgage indebtedness, the court held that the condemnor
should be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against the mort-
54 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 881, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 328 (1967).
55 In re Braddock Avenue, 278 N.Y. 163, 15 N.E.2d 563 (1938). See also 1
L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAw OF Emnar DomAIN § 111, at 473-74 &
n.31 (2d ed. 1953) (discussion of Braddock and subsequent difficulties).
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gagor's remaining property.5 6
Since the Lynbar case did not reach a result analogous to Brad-
dock, it is apparent that the concept envisioned by the Lynbar court
was narrower than the proposition adopted by the Braddock court:
That compensation should be based on all contractual relationships,
even if a party who has an interest in the land condemned must
actually pay a sum of money to one of the other parties. Whether
broad or narrow, however, it would be inconsistent with California
law to include in the total award all contractual relationships that
affect the ownership of the land.57 The weight of authority in Cali-
fornia is that the fair market value of the condemned land is to be
determined without reference to contractual rights and obligations af-
fecting the land.58 It is therefore suggested that the second proposi-
tion advanced by the court in Lynbar in support of its holding fails
to be persuasive.
The Application of the Undivided Fee Rule in California
The Lynbar court's final proposition is that while the undivided
fee rule is the majority rule, it is not the rule in California. The
California courts have rarely had occasion to discuss the undivided
fee rule, undoubtedly because the use or nonuse of the rule rarely
has substantive implications. 59 Of the four California cases that have
discussed the rule, however, only the Lynbar decision has held the
undivided fee rule inapplicable," and the other three decisions have
expressly espoused the rule. The Lynbar case dismissed the treat-
56 278 N.Y. 163, 174, 15 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1938).
57 In People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders,
Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53 (1956), relied upon by the condemnors in
Lynbar, the condemned land was subject to oil and gas leases, and at least one
of the lessees was unwilling to surrender his surface rights to the land. None-
theless, the court held that the leases were not a factor to be considered in
determining the availability of the land for its highest and best use.
In El Monte School Dist. v. Wilkins, 177 Cal. App. 2d 47, 1 Cal. Rptr.
715 (1960), also relied upon by the condemnors in Lynbar, the condemned
land was not only encumbered with leaseholds, but between the lessors and
lessees the structures on the land were personalty so far as the right of removal
was concerned. Nonetheless, for purposes of valuation, the lessees' contractual
right of removal was disregarded and between the condemnor and the condem-
nees the structures were considered as part of the realty.
In Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1967), the existence of an exploration and develop-
ment lease was disregarded in computing the value of the land taken. See
People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345,
33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963).
58 See note 57 supra.
59 See 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOmAIN § 112,
at 480 (2d ed. 1953).
60 See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders,
Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 107, 298 P.2d 53, 55 (1956).
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ment of the rule in El Monte School District v. Wilkins
6' as dictum, 62
and said it was unnecessary 63 in People ex rel. Department of Public
Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders, Inc.64 No doubt the espousal of the
rule in Costa Mesa Union School District v. Security First National
Bank" would also have been dismissed as dictum or unnecessary if
the case had been decided prior to Lynbar.66
The purpose of the following analysis of these cases, i.e., Wilkins,
S. & E. Homebuilders and Costa Mesa, is to establish two proposi-
tions: First, the undivided fee rule was essential to the holding in
each of the three cases; and secondly, that when the use of the un-
divided fee rule favors the condemnee, that rule should be used.
In Wilkins, the court considered as realty those structures which
were, between the lessors and lessees, personalty. One of the ques-
tions on appeal was whether, in the apportionment phase of the trial,
the lessees had received adequate compensation. After the jury had
returned its verdict fixing the market value of the whole property,
the lower court found that the compensation due to each of the lessees
was equivalent to the removal value of the structures. It is apparent
that to have the jury determine the market value of the land without
reference to the value of the lessees' interests-which could only be
considered if the structures were regarded as personalty-and then
to have the court determine the compensation due the lessees inde-
pendently of, and without reference to, the total sum to be awarded,
logically permits the adoption of only one theory, the undivided fee
rule. The appellate court upheld that method of compensation. Thus,
despite the Lynbar court's statement that approval of the undivided
fee rule in this case was dictum, the actual use of the rule was an
essential presupposition underlying the appellate court's holding.
The undivided fee rule was also used by the court as a justifica-
tion for regarding the lessees' personalty as realty in the condemna-
tion action. Since this was not an issue on appeal, it needed no
justification. The statement of the rule therefore, actually was un-
necessary. It was important, nonetheless, as a statement of policy.
It is not hard to imagine a case similar to Wilkins in which the
structures that belonged to the lessee substantially increase the value
of the realty as a whole, but because the lessee has the right of re-
moval, and because such removal would largely destroy the value of
the structures, the structures add little or nothing to the value of
either the lessor's or lessee's interest considered separately. Professor
Nichols, in his work on eminent domain,6 7 poses this problem and
61 177 Cal. App. 2d 47, 1 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1960).
62 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 877, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 326 (1967).
63 Id. at 878, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
64 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53 (1956).
65 254 Cal. App. 2d 4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1967).
66 The Costa Mesa case was decided five days after the Lynbar decision.
67 P. NicHOLs, THE LAw OF EmnqFNT DoNauN (rev. 3d ed. 1962).
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then concludes:
If the condemnor has to pay the whole additional value of the real
estate due to the existence of the buildings and fixtures, either the
landlord or the tenant will receive more than his interest is worth.
Whether this is one of the cases in which the value of the real estate
as such is disregarded and the total value of the separate interests in
the real estate is the proper measure of compensation is not yet en-
tirely clear.68
The fact situation hypothesized here is quite analogous to the situa-
tion referred to previously where a restrictive lease prevented the
property from being used in the highest and most profitable manner,
in that the total value of the lessor's and lessee's interests is less than
the undivided fair market value of the property. It was there indi-
cated that the use of the undivided fee rule would yield a result favor-
able to the condernees, and the result would be the same in the
present hypothetical. Although Professor Nichols expressed doubt
about the propriety of using the undivided fee rule in the present
hypothetical, the court in Wilkins had no such doubts. Unlike the
above stated hypothetical, the structures owned by the lessees in
Wilkins added nothing to the value of the realty as a whole.6 9 None-
theless, there is no reason to suspect that the court would not have
approved of the undivided fee rule if the facts had corresponded with
the much more likely hypothetical, since the only party that could
possibly have suffered in Wilkins was the lessor, and yet it was the
lessee that was appealing.
It may be concluded therefore, that Wilkins supplies some author-
ity for the proposition that when the undivided fee rule works to the
advantage of the condemnees, that rule should be used.
In Costa Mesa the declaration of the undivided fee rule appears
even more like dictum than in Wilkins. Although the use or nonuse
of the rule was not the question on appeal, the adequacy of the lessee's
compensation was again the issue. On appeal it was held that after
the total award has been determined, the interest of the leaseholder
must then be determined, even though that interest played no part in
the determination of the total award. By so deciding, the court implic-
itly affirmed the use of the undivided fee rule.
As in Wilkins, the espousal of the undivided fee rule has a broader
significance in Costa Mesa than would appear at first glance. The
rule was used as a justification for disregarding an extremely restric-
tive exploration and development lease in determining the value of
the land as a whole. The appellate report did not reveal, however,
whether the restrictions upon the lessee resulted in any actual disuse
of the rented property, and the facts indicate that any restrictions
upon the lessee's use of the land might have been offset to some ex-
tent, at least, by the lessor's retained right to use the land for agri-
cultural purposes. Assuming, however, that there was some disuse of
the land, this case corresponds perfectly to the situation earlier re-
68 4 id. § 13.121(1), at 375.
09 177 Cal. App. 2d at 54, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
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ferred to involving a restrictive lease, and thus, the use of the un-
divided fee rule would be advantageous to the condemnees. Conse-
quently, Costa Mesa adds some support to the proposition advanced
above, that when the undivided fee rule favors the condemnees, the
rule should be used.
In S. & E. Homebuilders, the court quoted and approved the
following portion of respondent's brief:
[T]here is not one California decision, which extensive research has
developed, to the effect that it is proper to say that a property such as
here, immediately usable, legally and practically, for industrial sub-
division purposes, is not 'available' therefor because of private con-
tractual agreement existing between two of the co-owners of interest
in such property in an action where the condemning body seeks to
acquire the fee simple estate.' 0
The court concluded that it was not error for the trial court to in-
struct the jury that "the parcel in question was to be valued as if
owned by one person, regardless of the separate interests therein."'
It is clear, therefore, that the question on appeal was whether the
undivided fee rule should be used, and that the appellate court af-
firmed its use.
The court in Lynbar dismissed the use of the undivided fee rule
in S. & E. Homebuilders as unnecessary on the ground that the leases
were "totally inoperative." This argument, however, is not only a
non sequitur, but is also without factual support. It is true that the
two lessees had not utilized their surface rights in connection with
their oil and gas rights, and one of the lessees had offered to co-
operate with the lessor in the industrial development of the land.
The net effect of the leasing arrangement, however, was that the land
was not being used. Furthermore, the lessees had refused to quit-
claim their rights to the surface, and the estimated life of the leases
was 14 years. There is no way to circumvent the fact that the lessees
had legal, compensable interests in the land, and that, because of the
consequent disuse of the land, the case corresponds to the situation
referred to above where a restrictive lease prevented the property
from being used in the highest and most profitable manner. More-
over, the appraisers were not indifferent to the effect of the lessees'
rights upon the market value of the land. The three expert witnesses
for the condemnees, without consideration of the restrictive leases,
estimated the market value of the land to be, respectively, $184,350,
$211,636, and $191,156. The three expert witnesses for the state, with
full consideration of the restrictive leases, estimated the market value
of the land to be, respectively, $53,048, $50,600, and $55,634. On cross
examination, one of the state's expert witnesses admitted that if the
restrictive leases were not considered, and if the land had been in
single ownership, the full value would have been $87,939. It is appar-
ent, therefore, that the existence or non-existence of the leases, re-
70 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. S. & E. Homebuilders,
Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 107, 298 P.2d 53, 55 (1956).
71 Id. at 109, 298 P.2d at 55.
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gardless of whether they were operative or not, was the critical fac-
tor. Given the existence of the leases, and the consequent rights of
the lessees, the use of the undivided fee rule would result in a sub-
stantially larger award than an aggregation of the values of the own-
ers' respective interests. In fact, the jury's award, using the un-
divided fee rule, was $111,930, which was more than twice the value
placed upon the land by those witnesses who took account of the
restrictive leases.
It may be concluded, therefore, that the S. & E. Homebuilders
case provides direct and persuasive support for the proposition that
the undivided fee rule will be used when its use favors the con-
demnees. It follows from the qualified support for this proposition
found in both the Wilkins case and the Costa Mesa case that all of the
cases that adopt the undivided fee rule in California are consistent
with a policy that favors the condemnee. This policy is also consist-
ent with the ruling in Lynbar, for the net effect of the holding in
Lynbar is that the undivided fee rule should not be used when it
works to the disadvantage of the condemnee. Thus, the California
rule emerges: If one party is to be enriched, let it be the condenmee,
and if one party must suffer a loss, let it be the condemnor.
The Undivided Fee Rule Is Not the California Rule
Notwithstanding the preceeding discussion, it could be argued
that the undivided fee rule is still the general rule in California, and
that the Lynbar case is only an exception to the general rule or,
alternatively, that the Lynbar decision can actually be reconciled
with the undivided fee rule.
Possible Reconciliation
The argument for the reconciliation of the undivided fee rule with
Lynbar is based upon the holding in People ex rel. Department of
Public Works v. Dunn,72 and the later codification of that holding in
Evidence Code section 817,73 i.e., that actual rentals are a proper con-
sideration in determining the market value of the property as a
whole.74 Even though the Lynbar court expressly refused to base its
decision upon the Dunn case75 it could be argued that Dunn did, in
reality, justify the Lynbar decision, and that both Dunn and Lynbar
are consistent with the undivided fee rule.
This reconciliation can be best explained by noting the words of
the Missouri Supreme Court in St. Louis v. Rossi,7 6 a case often cited
72 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956).
73 See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal.
App. 2d 870, 876, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 325 (1967).
74 46 Cal. 2d at 641, 297 P.2d at 966.
75 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.
2d 870, 876, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 325 (1967).
76 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S.W.2d 600 (1933).
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for its classic opinion in support of the undivided fee rule. The
Missouri court declared: "It is, of course, true that a favorable lease
does increase the value of property and that the amount of income
which is derived from property is always properly considered in de-
termining its value."77 The point is that actual income derived from
property is usually a more reliable index to the property's market
value than is speculative income. The experts who estimate the con-
deuined property's market value are not in any way limited to a con-
sideration of actual rentals, but neither are they precluded from in-
specting them. The Dunn case and Evidence Code section 817 require
that evidence of actual rentals be considered. St. Louis v. Rossi en-
dorsed this procedure as an adjunct to the undivided fee rule, and
such evidence was actually considered in S. & E. Homebuilders, the
leading California case applying the undivided fee rule.
If it be remembered that the choice in Lynbar was between "tak-
ing into account" the Tidewater lease or completely disregarding it,
the court's adherence to the first alternative would seem entirely con-
sistent with the undivided fee rule. The three estimates that did
take the lease into account-$89,475, $125,000, and $180,000-especially
when compared with the estimates that disregarded the lease, speak
loudly for the proposition that when a jury is confronted with both
the undivided fee rule and a lease very favorable to the lessor it will
have ample opportunity to reward the lessor for the bargain he has
made. Upon this analysis, which takes due notice of the flexibility
inherent in jury awards of compensation, it could be expected that if
a jury in the Lynbar case had been instructed in accordance with the
undivided fee rule, and if the same evidence respecting actual rental
income had been allowed, the jury would have returned an award
quite similar to the actual award in Lynbar.78
Thus, the Dunn case, although decided before either S. & E. Home-
builders or Lynbar, effects a possible reconciliation between the un-
divided fee rule and Lynbar. Perhaps this is why the supreme court,
which decided the Dunn case, denied hearings to both S. & E. Home-
builders and Lynbar. But it is better to conclude otherwise for the
reconciliation is only superficial. Essential to the reconciliation is the
obvious ambiguity respecting the meaning of "taking into account"
existing rental income. The academic dishonesty in perpetuating this
ambiguity could perhaps be accepted as part of California law were
it not that the problem is more serious. Such a reconciliation forces
either the court or the jury to behave unconscionably. In the S. & E.
Homebuilders case, testimony was allowed estimating the market
value of the land encumbered with the leases, and yet the jury re-
turned a verdict more than twice as large as any of these estimates.1 9
77 Id. at 1106, 64 S.W.2d at 606.
78 Such a reconciliation has at least been implicitly suggested. See 1 L.
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DomAIN § 112, at 480 (2d ed.
1953).
79 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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In Lynbar, testimony was allowed estimating the market value of the
undivided fee, and yet the court affirmed an award that was more
than twice the size of any of those estimates.
It is therefore apparent that to reconcile Lynbar with the un-
divided fee rule on the strength of Dunn is unjustifiable. The holding
in Dunn should be limited to the ordinary case of divided interests
where actual rental income might really be an accurate index to the
land's market value. 0 S. & E. Homebuilders and Lynbar were not
ordinary cases of divided interests; the problems and solutions in-
volved were unique, and if the cases are reconcilable it is only on a
policy basis.
Lynbar As An Exception to the General Rule
It was suggested earlier that the argument could be made that
since it has always been well recognized that there are exceptions to
the undivided fee rule,8 1 Lynbar can be classified as such an excep-
tion. If the undivided fee rule is the general rule in California, it is a
general rule with unusual consequences; and if the Lynbar case is an
exception to the general rule, it is an exception with unusual conse-
quences.
As already mentioned,8 2 the theory behind the undivided fee rule
is that a condemnation proceeding is an action in rem. No less signifi-
cant as a corollary of the undivided fee rule is the often stated principle
that the sum of the separate values of the divided interests may not
exceed the value of the whole.8  Clearly, by this principle, the value
of the undivided fee is the upper limit of compensation. This princi-
ple is consistent with both the normal application of the undivided
fee rule, and the normal exception to the rule-when the result ob-
tained would be a substantially smaller award for the condemnees by
application of the aggregate of the interests rule.84 A few cases have
suggested that if the sum of the interests exceeded the value of the
undivided whole, the award should be based on the sum of the in-
terests.8 5 These cases, however, are doubtful authority.86  Although
80 See generally Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48
VA. L. REV. 477, 490 (1962).
81 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal.
App. 2d 870, 875-76, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320, 325 (1967); 4 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAW OF
EMINENT DoMAIN § 12.2 (rev. 3d ed. 1962).
82 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
83 See, e.g., United States v. 25.936 Acres of Land, 153 F.2d 277, 279 (3d
Cir. 1946); St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 1102-03, 64 S.W.2d 600, 604-05
(1933). See also 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DomAIN
§ 109, at 461-62 (2d ed. 1953).
84 See, e.g., Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910);
Baltimore v. United States, 147 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir. 1945).
85 See Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 631, 61 A. 203, 205-06 (1905);
State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 325 Mo. 165, 172, 28 S.W.2d 80, 82 (1930).
86 The same court that decided State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 325 Mo.
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case reports are inadequate to reach a positive conclusion,87 in light of
the principle stated above, it is doubtful that the undivided fee rule
has ever been employed to obtain a substantially larger award than
would be obtained by aggregating the interests.
In California, on the other hand, in every case where the un-
divided fee rule has been specifically accepted, its use would result in
a potentially larger award for the condemnees.8 8 Similarly, on the
only occasion where the rule is denounced, in Lynbar, its use would
result in a reduced award to the condemnees.89 Thus, where the
undivided fee rule would normally be applied, California invokes the
exception, and where the exception to the rule would normally be
invoked, California applies the rule. The value of the undivided fee
thereby forms the lower, rather than the upper, limit of compensa-
tion in California. Consequently, to classify Lynbar as an exception
to the generally accepted undivided fee rule is to reject the thrust of
the above stated California rule, and would appear to be unjustified.
Conclusion
The thesis argued in this note is quite narrow in scope. It in-
volves only two types of factual situations. In one situation, either
the condemnor or the condemnees would be enriched by the condem-
nation; California resolved the issue by invoking the undivided fee
rule to the ultimate advantage of the condemnees. In the other situa-
tion, either the condemnor or the condemnee would suffer a loss be-
cause of the condemnation; California resolved that issue by denounc-
ing the undivided fee rule, again to the ultimate advantage of the
condemnee.
In those instances where the use or nonuse of the undivided fee
rule has substantive implications, California follows the unique and
laudable course of adopting whichever rule will favor the condemnee.
Whether this policy will be followed in other areas of the law of
eminent domain remains to be seen. In any event, a frank admission
of the policy behind the use or nonuse of the undivided fee rule would
do much to eliminate the confusion that plagues this area of the law.
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165, 28 S.W.2d 80 (1930), strongly endorsed the undivided fee rule three years
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87 See 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER TEm LAW OF EMINENT DomAwN § 110,
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88 See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
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California court. The aggregate of interests rule has been used in other
California cases, but never with the effect of causing the lessor to suffer an
arbitrary loss. See Federal Oil Co. v. Culver City, 179 Cal. App. 2d 93, 98-100,
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